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Abstract
This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the interaction
between the pre- and post-merger processes. We argue that failure may stem from infor-
mational asymmetries arising from the pre-merger period, and problems of cooperation and
coordination within recently merged ﬁrms. We show that a partner may optimally agree to
merge and abstain from putting forth any post-merger eﬀort, counting on the other partner
to make the necessary eﬀorts. If both follow the same course of action, the merger goes
ahead but fails. Our unique equilibrium allows us to make predictions on which mergers are
more likely to fail.
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1 Introduction
Despite observing consistently strong merger activity around the world, a vast number of these
corporate unions seem to be unsuccessful. Indeed, over the last ﬁfteen years, 43% of all merged
ﬁrms worldwide reported lower proﬁts than comparable non-merged ﬁrms (Gugler et al. [24]).
Likewise, more than 50% of investigated U.S. mergers earned negative cumulative abnormal
returns (Agrawal et al. [2]).1 Given these disappointing outcomes, it is not surprising that more
than half of the merged ﬁrms end up being divested (Porter [44]). Dessein et al. [17] conﬁrm
that “there are countless examples of failed mergers that were unable to achieve the synergies
that motivated the deal”.
This paper proposes a formal explanation of failure in mergers for synergies. Our setup takes
explicitly into account the interactions between the pre- and post-merger processes. We argue
that failure may stem from informational asymmetries arising from the pre-merger period, and
problems of cooperation and coordination when recently merged. We shall show that, based on
its pre-merger information, a ﬁrm might optimally agree on merging and abstain from exerting
post-merger eﬀorts. By hoping to free-ride on the eﬀorts of the other partner, a ﬁrm might
expect to obtain some merger gains that would compensate the costs of merging. But, if both
partners follow the same course of action, the merger goes ahead and fails.
Our pre- and post-merger setups contain key features of a merger for synergies. Pre-merger,
potential merger gains are uncertain. Indeed, the reaction of competitors, the evolution of the
economic fundamentals and the strategic ﬁt are unknown at the time of merging (Haspeslagh
and Jemison [30]). Therefore, prospective partners collect information about the potential gains
from merging by, for example, hiring investment banks (Servaes and Zenner [58]). However,
although part of this information might be available to both ﬁrms, another part certainly remains
private. This is because at this point it is not sure that the merger is going to materialize. If
ﬁrms decide in the end not to merge, they could use the obtained information against each other
when competing. In sum, it is assumed that prospective merging partners possess some private
information on uncertain merger gains.
Postmerger, merging companies attempt to realize synergies by integrating speciﬁc hard-
to-trade resources. These synergies can be obtained through the adaption and modiﬁcation
1Practitioners’ studies estimate merger failure to be even more frequent; their estimated failure rate lies well
above 50%, and is sometimes believed to be even as high as 85% (Copeland et al. [15]).
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of existing products and processes, leading to knowledge and capabilities that did not exist
before the merger (Farrell and Shapiro [19]). Suppose, for example, that a ﬁrm specializing in
basic programming merges with a ﬁrm that employs experts in system design. By combining
their knowledge, partners might be able to produce a new and superior computer apparatus,
both in calculus performance and usefulness for an organization. But, a more cost-eﬀective and
superior product can be developed, only if one partner writes the necessary programs and the
other designs the adequate system. Synergies are thus by deﬁnition not achievable through the
actions of a single merging party (Farrell and Shapiro [19]).2
But implementing the right post-merger actions —writing those programs and developing
a system so that each ﬁts one another— necessarily involves a private cost for each partner.
Accordingly, synergies can only be attained through a relation-speciﬁc and privately costly
eﬀort.3 These eﬀorts are non-contractible, given that they are diﬃcult to observe during the post-
merger process. Actions in this phase are usually diﬃcult to describe in suﬃcient detail (Mailath
et al. [37]) and decisions are often plagued by ambiguity (Vaara [63]). Action interdependencies
make it even more diﬃcult to measure separate contributions (Simon [59]). In sum, the post-
merger eﬀorts of each partner are assumed to be (i) necessary to achieve synergies, but (ii)
privately costly and (iii) non-contractible. As a result, they exhibit strategic complementarities,
thereby potentially leading to coordination problems.4
Indeed, in the organizational literature poor merger performance has often been connected
to post-merger coordination problems (see Larsson and Finkelstein [36] for an overview). Unlike
internal development and growth, newly merged ﬁrms cannot rely on preexisting coordination
mechanisms, such as standard operating procedures, routines, shared language and identiﬁca-
tion, which are all consequences of long-term relationships within the ﬁrm (see e.g. Kogut and
Zander [34]). This poor post-merger coordination, organizational researchers argue, hinders the
2Synergy gains are akin to the indirect gains from interdependent activities in organizations, as deﬁned by
Milgrom and Roberts [38],[39].
3As Wickelgren [69] conﬁrms: “Just because they [the merging partners] are part of one ﬁrm, however, does
not mean they will now only act in their joint, as opposed to their individual, interest.” It is said that managers’
motivation to cooperate comes from team spirit and trust (Kandel and Lazear [33]). But, this is exactly what
is lacking in a newly merged ﬁrm (Flynn [20], Seabright [56]). Further recent papers that model each merging
partner deciding upon a privately costly eﬀort include Dessein et al. [17] and Kretschmer and Puranam [35].
4Strategic complementarities are also consistent with the ﬁndings of a large literature in management that
concludes that tasks are more valuable when they cluster together (see Dessein and Santos [18] for an overview).
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optimal functioning of newly formed ﬁrms and therefore the ability to reap the projected synergy
gains.
Arguably, a potential way out of these coordination problems could be to “structurally
integrate” the merged ﬁrms. By grouping organizational units together, common authority,
systems and processes can then be used to reduce coordination issues. But, as conﬁrmed by
Puranam and Srikanth [47] and Puranam et al. [48], although post-merger integration helps
merging ﬁrms to leverage what the partners “know” by promoting coordination, it hinders their
ability to leverage what they do or “explore” because of a reduction in autonomy.5 In a merger
for synergies, there is a strong need for exploration because signiﬁcant eﬀort on products and
processes by each partner are required to reap synergies (Schilling [55]). As a result, merging
partners are frequently kept as separately fully functioning (see Wickelgren [69] and references
therein). Thus, despite the potential coordination problems, structural separation is the best
setting in a merger for synergies.
This organizational structure, however needed, has the additional problem of potential free-
riding by partners. Free-riding may occur because synergies are not the only obtainable merger
gains. This means that if only one partner makes an eﬀort, then other (non-synergetic) merger
gains can still be obtained. Going back to our example, it may be that when one partner develops
a better computer system, this still may lead to gains by selling the new system through the
already existing warehousing and delivery operations from the other partner. Merger gains, thus,
can be divided into non-synergetic gains achievable through the actions of a single partner, and
synergies, which are the gains that exceed the return of individual actions (Agarwal et al. [1]).
As a result, in a merger for synergies both issues of coordination and cooperation are potentially
present (Gulati et al. [25]).
The presence of asymmetric information allows us to ﬁnd a unique equilibrium in our setup.
In this equilibrium, if a partner expects substantial gains, it agrees on merging and exerts a
5 Integration implies a standardization of work practices and procedures between partner ﬁrms. These changes
can cause disruption, independent of any improvements brought about by a new conﬁguration of organizational
attributes (Amburgey et al. [5], Hannan and Freeman [26]). Changes can also alter organizational routines,
and in doing so can undermine creative and innovative capabilities (Benner and Tushman [9]). Ranft and Lord
[50], building on seven detailed case studies of technology acquisitions, argue that autonomy for acquired ﬁrms
-in terms of formal administrative structure and culture- simultaneously preserves tacit and socially embedded
technologies and capabilities.
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post-merger eﬀort. As a result, if both partners expect substantial gains, all potential merger
gains -including synergies- are obtained and the merger is successful. If one ﬁrm instead has
low expectations, then the merger will not go through. More interestingly, we show that, if a
partner has intermediate expectations, it might optimally agree on merging and abstain from
exerting any post-merger eﬀort. While by not making an eﬀort one precludes the possibility of
obtaining synergy gains, merging might still be proﬁtable. By hoping to free-ride on the eﬀorts
of the other partner, a ﬁrm expects to obtain non-synergetic gains that would compensate the
costs of merging. This can happen when the other partner expects higher potential merger gains
and is thus willing to exert eﬀort, in the belief that both partners will jointly realize synergy
gains.
If both partners follow the same course of action, however, the merger goes ahead and
fails, because both abstain from exerting any post-merger eﬀort. Failure may thus occur even
though the management of each ﬁrm takes the appropriate merger decision in expected terms.
Provided that shareholders do not have more information than the managers of their own ﬁrm,
they should also accept the agreement.6 Failure could not have been avoided by post-merger
communication either. Each partner has incentives to overstate its information, independently
of its eﬀort decisions. Indeed, it always prefers to let the other to exert an eﬀort. Under these
conditions, credible communication cannot be supported in equilibrium, as shown by Baliga and
Morris [6].
Our explanation thus provides a formal rationale for why and how post-merger problems
can be the cause of merger failure, as is often claimed by the organizational literature. It must
be stressed that, although all the mergers in our setting have the potential for synergy gains,
failure happens because the merger partners do not pursue synergy gains. Indeed, as pointed
out in Banal-Estañol et al. [7] and Kretschmer and Puranam [35], synergy implementation is
a strategic decision. It is further important to note that it is the very characteristics of post-
merger eﬀorts in a merger for synergies -leading to potential problems of both cooperation and
coordination- that may lead to the explained course of actions. Indeed, for failure to occur, not
exerting eﬀort should not be the optimal decision for all levels of expectations. If this was the
case, ﬁrms would not enter a merger. Solely pure post-merger coordination problems would not
6Although many mergers may fail through our mechanism, mergers should be proﬁtable on average. Rhodes-
kropf and Viswanathan [51] use a similar rationale to explain why targets may accept bids from overvalued bidders
in periods of high market valuations.
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lead to failure either, since ﬁrms would exert eﬀort if they merged.
The approach we follow and consequently the unique equilibrium helps to make predictions
on which mergers are more likely to suﬀer from organizational problems. First, mergers with
higher expected potential gains suﬀer less from post-merger issues. In general, however, one
should not just rely on the value of potential synergies, but must consider organizational variables
as well. In particular, the lower the cost of post-merger eﬀorts and the higher their degree of
complementarity, the lower the probability of failure. On the contrary, the lower the opportunity
costs of merging -i.e. what ﬁrms earn as stand-alone proﬁts plus the (ﬁxed) cost of merging-
the higher the probability of failure. Firms merge then more often and, by taking this decision
more easily, they transmit less positive information to their partners. As a result, partners exert
eﬀort less often in the post-merger process.
Of course, there are other reasons apart from organizational diﬃculties that may explain
failure. Mergers might fail because of plain “bad luck”, because the realization of the uncer-
tainty falls short of the expectation. Managers can also be empire-builders and merge, not to
increase shareholder’s proﬁts, but to belong to a larger ﬁrm (Jensen [32]). Unproﬁtable mergers
may further occur because ﬁrms may merge to preempt their partners from merging with ri-
vals (Fridolfsson and Stennek [21]). Finally, managers may irrationally overestimate the future
performance of the merged entity, so-called “managerial hubris”, due to the underestimation of
internal conﬂicts (Banal-Estañol et al. [7]) or by not foreseeing problems derived from conﬂicting
organizational cultures (Weber and Camerer [68]).
There are few papers in the economics literature that study post-merger problems in general
and coordination issues in particular. Agarwal et al. [1] investigate experimentally how prior
alliances between merger partners aﬀect merger performance. Similar to our framework, they
“focus on post-acquisition coordination problems, given prior [organizational] research highlight-
ing its importance” (Agarwal et al. [1], p. 3). In their setup, managers need to allocate the
resources they control to either individual activities, which generate private proﬁts, or to com-
bined production activities, which might generate additional beneﬁts. These latter activities,
however, require a minimum amount of combined resources. In equilibrium, a manager would
contribute to the combined activities if and only if the other is contributing as well. Fulghieri and
Hodrick [23] investigate the post-merger interactions between synergies and internal agency con-
ﬂicts. Divisional managers may be able to reduce the likelihood of having their divisions divested
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by reducing the attractiveness for alternative use. As in our setup, strategic complementarities
might generate multiple equilibria if information is complete. In their paper, expectations about
the behaviors in other parts of the organization may determine which particular equilibrium will
be selected.
Our model can be seen as a variant of a global game (Carlsson and van Damme [11]). In
these type of games, agents’ payoﬀs (realized merger gains in our model) depend on the action
chosen by the other agents (the post-merger eﬀort) and some unknown economic fundamental
(the potential merger gains). Agents receive public and private signals that generate beliefs
about the economic fundamental and about the actions and beliefs of the other agents. Morris
and Shin [40] showed that this incomplete information game has a unique equilibrium as long as
the public signal is noisy enough. If the public signal becomes too precise, coordination problems
and multiple equilibria arise as in the complete information case. In our setting, prior to the
global game (the post-merger stage), the decision of whether to participate (the merger decision)
allows players to update their beliefs about the signals of the other players. Uniqueness in our
setup is then only ensured when the private signals are noisy enough, which is a consequence
of the fact that the decision to participate in the game makes part of the private information
public.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 explains the equilibrium. Section 4 provides our explanation of merger failure. Section 5
performs comparative statics and Section 6 gives our empirical predictions. Section 7 concludes.
In Appendix A we provide preliminaries for the proofs, which are assigned to Appendix B.
2 Model
2.1 Main Setting
Two ﬁrms examine the possibility to merge. If the merger does not occur, each will earn
the stand-alone proﬁts  ∈ R. Merging proﬁts, on the other hand, depend on the uncertain
potential gains from merging and on the extent to which these gains will actually be obtained
in the post-merger process. Accordingly, the proﬁts for each merging ﬁrm can be written as
 + 2− , where  ∈ R represents the potential gains from merging,  ∈ [0 1] the degree of
7Angeletos et al. [4] obtain a similar result to ours in a dynamic version of Morris and Shin’s [40] model.
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fulﬁllment and   0 a (net) ﬁxed cost for merging.8 We consider thus the case of two symmetric
ﬁrms deciding upon a merger of equals, whereby proﬁts are shared equally.
In line with Rajan and Zingales [49], we think it is realistic to claim that managers -and
more speciﬁcally the top management- take the decisions within the ﬁrm. While it is reasonable
to expect that employees at all levels impart their own inﬂuence on the post-merger process,
the top management of each forming ﬁrm plays the crucial role in establishing and shaping the
strategic direction of the whole group (Chatterjee et al. [13]). This allows us to concentrate on
the managerial decisions. We will henceforth use the terms ‘ﬁrm’ or ‘merger partner’, bearing
in mind that it is always the top management of these ﬁrms that takes the decisions.
The decision to merge, though, needs the approval of each ﬁrm’s shareholders. However,
assuming that the (risk-neutral) management of each ﬁrm is paid an exogenous and symmetric
fraction of the merger surplus, managers will always obtain the consent of their (risk-neutral)
shareholders if they decide to seek merger approval. Indeed, shareholders have access to the
same information as their managers and will not bear the costs of post-merger actions, while
also receiving a symmetric proportion of the surplus. Therefore, if a merger is proﬁtable for the
management, then it should also be proﬁtable for the shareholders. For simplicity, we normalize
the fraction of the proﬁts that goes to the management of each partner to one half.9
We analyze the merger process by using the following game. In the pre-merger period, both
ﬁrms collect information about the potential gains from merging. In the merger period, ﬁrms
decide whether to merge. One ﬁrm, denoted as Firm 1 ﬁrst decides whether to propose a
8There could be merger gains obtainable independent of the results of the post-merger process, e.g. through
the elimination of ﬁxed costs by having one headquarter instead of two. In our setup, these gains would be
substracted from the costs  of merging. If they were so large that they compensate the costs of merging, then we
would have  ≤ 0. In this case, however, a merger would always be proﬁtable and, as a consequence, no failure
could occur. We limit ourselves for the remainder of the paper to the case of   0
9Giving each manager of the merged ﬁrm an equal part will be the incentive scheme most conducive to synergies
and therefore the most natural in a merger for synergies. It is true that in other types of mergers (e.g. a merger
for market power), giving each manager an equal part might not always be optimal (see e.g. Banal-Estañol and
Ottaviani [8]). Indeed, in Banal-Estañol et al. [7], using a related setup to our model here, we show that better
eﬀort incentives may be obtained by increasing the percentage of proﬁts to one partner and compensating the
other partner via a ﬁxed fee. However, full synergies will never be obtained, since the partner receiving a ﬁxed
fee will not exert eﬀort, and therefore is not suited to a setup where the intended primary goal of the merger is
synergy realization. See also Dessein et al. [17], Kretschmer and Puranam [35] and Wickelgren [69], who analyze
the use of optimal incentives to manage interdependence in multi-product ﬁrms.
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merger to the other, Firm 2, which in turn decides whether to accept.10 If both ﬁrms agree to
merge, then in the post-merger period, merging partners attempt to realize the potential gains
from merging. At the end of the post-merger process, ﬁrms evaluate whether the merger was
successful. The timing of the game, described in more detail in the following subsections, is
represented in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here
2.2 Pre-merger Period
In the pre-merger period, prospective partners collect information about the potential gains from
merging by hiring, for example, investment banks (Servaes and Zenner [58]). Although part of
this information might be available to both ﬁrms, another part is certainly private. Indeed, at
this point it is not sure that the merger is going to materialize and ﬁrms could use the obtained
information against each other when competing. Full information disclosure before the merger
materializes may also violate competition laws.11
Formally, before any information gathering, the gains are completely uncertain and therefore
 is a priori randomly drawn from the real line, with each realization equally likely.12 Obtained
information can be classiﬁed into private or public. The information derived from non-shared
research and knowledge is summarized into two noisy private signals of the true gains,
 =  +  for  = 1 2 (1)
Parameters  represent the noise and are assumed to be independently identically distributed
with  ∼ (− ) and independent from . The knowledge available to both ﬁrms is assumed
10Merger decisions are modeled as sequential decisions to avoid the equilibrium where both ﬁrms decide not
to merge for any level of potential gains. This equilibrium appears only when ﬁrms take the merger decision at
exactly the same point in time.
11The Federal Trade Commission articulates that the exchange of sensitive information prior to the clearance of
the merger may amount to a breach of the United States competition legislation. Several successful legal actions
have been brought on this basis (see for example FTC Watch No. 265, at 3; 232-233, and the Case United States
v. Input/Output, Inc. and Laitram Corp., 1999 WL 1425404, at *1 ).
12The assumption that  is uniformly distributed on the real line presents no technical diﬃculties as long as we
are concerned only with conditional beliefs. As Morris and Shin [40] argue, such an improper prior is the same
as assuming that the prior distribution of  becomes diﬀuse.
9
to be summarized in a noisy public signal of the true gains,
 =  +  (2)
Parameter  represents again the noise and we presume  ∼ (− ) and ,  and  to be
independent. For simplicity, we set the three signals equally precise.
2.3 Merger Decisions
The merger period starts with Firm 1 deciding whether to make a merger proposal to Firm
2. Equivalently, Firm 1 is the ﬁrst ﬁrm to publicly announce whether it agrees to merge.13
In taking this decision, it uses its available information, 1 ≡ {1 }, to update its beliefs
about the potential gains, ( | 1 ), and its beliefs about the private signal received by Firm 2,
(2 | 1 ). If Firm 1 decides not to propose, both ﬁrms obtain the stand-alone proﬁts  and
the game ends.14 If it decides to propose, then it is Firm 2’s turn to respond.
Subsequently, Firm 2 decides whether to accept or reject the proposal, based on its available
information 2 ≡ {2  Firm 1 agreed to merge}. It can reject and terminate the game,
resulting in the stand-alone proﬁts  for each ﬁrm. If on the other hand, Firm 2 accepts, the
merger takes place. Each ﬁrm pays the merging costs  and becomes a partner in the new entity.
The two partners then enter into the post-merger process.
2.4 Post-merger Process
Following the discussion in Farrell and Shapiro [19], we divide the potential gains from merging
 into synergy and non-synergy gains. From the “right” actions of a single partner, the merged
entity can only obtain direct non-synergy gains  . Synergies, on the other hand, are the indirect
gains that can be obtained from the joint actions of both partners, exceeding the direct return
of the individual actions, − −  = (1− 2) where   2. Hence, maximum obtainable merger
gains  are divided into 2 direct non-synergy gains and (1− 2) synergy gains.
As explained in the introduction and consistent with empirical observations (see Wickelgren
[69] and references therein), merging partners in our setup are kept as fully functioning, with
13We will show that the order in which ﬁrms announce their decision does not matter. It would be therefore
equivalent to assume that only proposals or acceptances are observed.
14We assume that both the costs of merging and the stand-alone proﬁts are certain. Results would not change
if these parameters were random, as long as their expected values are the same for both ﬁrms.
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the corresponding managers having the discretion to make decisions. Indeed, as argued by
Puranam et al. (2009) and Farrell and Shapiro [19], for example, each partner brings —and
potentially applies— speciﬁc and hard-to-trade knowledge and resources in a merger for synergies.
Of course, implementing the right post-merger actions necessarily involves a relation-speciﬁc cost
for each partner. For example, making the right use of the resources within the merged ﬁrm may
imply foregoing a more market-oriented goal (Banal-Estañol et al. [7]). Accordingly, our model
assumes that synergies can only be obtained through privately costly eﬀorts; each partner’s
eﬀort comes at a cost .15
Post-merger eﬀorts are assumed to be non-veriﬁable and also unobservable during the post-
merger process and therefore chosen as if they were exerted simultaneously (as in Dessein et al.
[17]). Indeed, actions in the post-merger phase are likely to be plagued by ambiguity about what
the other is doing (Vaara [63]). Further, in the initial post-merger context it is intrinsically hard
to describe the desired actions to distinguish them from seemingly similar actions which have
very diﬀerent consequences (Mailath et al. [37]). Additionally, interdependencies of actions may
make it even more diﬃcult to measure separate contributions of partners at this stage (Simon
[59]).
In summary, based on the information available  ≡ {  Firm  agreed to merge}, each
merging partner decides whether to exert an eﬀort,  ∈ {0 1} The fulﬁlled merger gains are
(1 2). When both partners exert eﬀort, both synergy and non-synergy gains are obtained
and the degree of fulﬁllment of potential merging gains is (1 1) = 1, i.e. gains are not dis-
counted. If only one partner makes an eﬀort, no synergy gains are obtained and the fulﬁllment
factor is (1 0) = (0 1) = 1 where   2. If none of them makes an eﬀort, we let the penalty
to be extremely high, (0 0) = 0 and zero merger gains are obtained.16 The uncertain pay-
oﬀs for (the management of) each partner, gross of merging costs and stand-alone proﬁts, are
summarized in Table (3).
15Scharfstein and Stein [53] attribute a similar setup to divisional rent-seeking, Fulghieri and Hodrick [23] to
managerial entrenchment, and Agarwal et al. [1] to resource allocation towards combined activities. Further
recent papers that model each merging partner deciding upon a privately costly eﬀort include Dessein et al. [17]
and Kretschmer and Puranam [35].
16To fully discount the potential gains if none makes any eﬀort is just a normalization of  (see footnote 8).
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Eﬀort (2 = 1) No Eﬀort (2 = 0)
Eﬀort (1 = 1) 2 −   2 −  2 −   2
No Eﬀort (1 = 0) 2  2 −  0  0
(3)
As one can easily check, post-merger actions to achieve positive gains are strategic comple-
ments;17 that is, the marginal return of a partner’s action is increasing in the level of action of
the other partner (Vives [66]). A larger  implies that actions are more complementary; rewards
from actions become larger when the partner has exerted eﬀort and smaller when it has not.
In a complete information setting -for example if ﬁrms received a public signal  only- three
scenarios would arise depending on the level of expected potential gains. If the gains were low,
not making an eﬀort would be a strictly dominant strategy for both ﬁrms. If the gains were high,
merging partners would exert eﬀort since this would be a strictly dominant strategy. Finally,
in the intermediate case, there would be multiple equilibria. The two partners making an eﬀort
and none exerting eﬀort would both be Nash equilibria. This indeterminacy is problematic when
one goes backwards to the merger stage. At the moment of taking merger decisions, ﬁrms do
not know in which equilibrium of the post-merger process they are going to coordinate.
Similar to the global games literature, the presence of asymmetric information enables us to
ﬁnd a unique equilibrium. The payoﬀs in our setup, however, are diﬀerent from the basic global
game as described in Morris and Shin [40], in which making no eﬀort yields a ﬁxed payoﬀ. This
diﬀerence will prove to be crucial for the occurrence of failure. If the payoﬀs of not making an
eﬀort were ﬁxed (and lower than the ﬁxed cost of merging), it would be impossible for a ﬁrm to
agree to merge and to exert no eﬀort later on. Here, the payoﬀs from not exerting eﬀort while
the partner exerts eﬀort increase with the expected eﬃciency gains  In other words, a partner
gains more from free-riding in the post-merger stage when the expected gains are higher.
3 Equilibrium Behavior
3.1 Deﬁnitions
To simplify our discussion, we ﬁrst consider the case in which ﬁrms receive only a private signal.
A strategy in this setting does not consist of two binary decisions as in the complete information
17 In the case of negative gains,   0, not to make eﬀort will be a dominant strategy.
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case, but in a mapping from the range of possible signals to those two binary choices. Given
that Firm 2’s merger decision only needs to be taken if Firm 1 has proposed, and post-merger
eﬀort decisions need only be taken if both ﬁrms have agreed to merge, strategies are fully deﬁned
without specifying the action of the other.
Deﬁnition 1 A strategy  for Firm ,  = 1 2, is a function specifying, for each possible private
signal  ∈ R, an action
1 : R→ [{Propose, Not propose} , {Eﬀort (1 = 1), No Eﬀort (1 = 0)}] and
2 : R→ [{ Accept, Not accept } , {Eﬀort (2 = 1), No Eﬀort (2 = 0)}] 
We concentrate on monotonic strategies, which in binary choice settings is equivalent to the
class of switching strategies. Depending on whether the signal is below or above a cutoﬀ point,
the player takes one action or the other. In our case, since we have two decisions, a strategy is
uniquely deﬁned by two cutoﬀ points.
Deﬁnition 2 A double switching strategy  for Firm ,  = 1 2, with cutoﬀs e and ee for





Propose iﬀ 1  e1





Accept iﬀ 2  e2
Eﬀort (2 = 1) iﬀ 2  ee2
The sequential ordering introduces another informational asymmetry (besides the private
signals). The ﬁrst-mover ﬁrm, Firm 1, has to take the proposing decision without knowing
whether Firm 2 will accept or reject later on. The following lemma shows that in our setup this
is de facto not the case.
Lemma 1 When deciding whether to propose, Firm 1 decides as if it knows that Firm 2 is
going to accept. As a result, both ﬁrms take the merger decision based on the same information
structure,  ≡ {  ≥ e} for  = 1 2 and  6= 
Firm 1’s decision is only relevant when Firm 2 accepts the merger because the stand-alone
proﬁts do not depend on who rejects the merger. Given this result, we denote from now on for
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expositional ease both the  and  decisions as , and similarly  
and   as  .
From Table (3), if Firm  chooses a double switching strategy around (e  ee), Firm  exerts
eﬀort whenever
( e  ee) ≡ (− 1)( |  ) Pr ( ≥ ee | ) +( |  ) Pr ( ≤ ee | )− 2 ≥ 0
where  ≡ {  ≥ ee} and  = {   ee} and recall that  ≡ {  ≥ e}. Intuitively,
a higher private signal  raises the expected merger gains and the probability that the partner
exerts eﬀort. Hence, the function (·) is increasing in  and the partner makes more easily
an eﬀort when it receives a higher signal. As a consequence, this condition uniquely deﬁnes a
post-merger eﬀort cutoﬀ ee for each double switching strategy of the other ﬁrm (e  ee). Firm 
exerts eﬀort if and only if  ≥ ee.
At the merger stage, therefore, Firm  knows whether it will make an eﬀort later on. If Firm
 knows that it would exert eﬀort in the post-merger stage,  ≥ ee, it merges whenever
( e  ee) ≡ ( |  ) Pr ( ≥ ee | ) +( |  ) Pr ( ≤ ee | )− 2(+ ) ≥ 0
Similarly, if Firm  knows that it would not make an eﬀort later on,   ee, it merges whenever
( e  ee) ≡ ( |  ) Pr ( ≥ ee | )− 2 ≥ 0
Intuitively again, a higher private signal  increases (·) and (·) and induces Firm  to merge
more easily. Given that (ee e  ee) = (ee e  ee) the previous conditions uniquely deﬁne a
merger cutoﬀ e for each (e  ee) such that Firm  will decide to merge if and only if  ≥ e. In
summary, Firm ’s best response to a switching strategy is also a switching strategy.18
3.2 Equilibrium
Given that the model is (de facto) symmetric, we concentrate on equilibria in the class of
symmetric strategies whereby partners  and  play the same double switching strategy, e =
e ≡ e and ee = ee ≡ ee. We proceed in three steps. In a ﬁrst step, we provide necessary and
18This implies that when solving for equilibria within the class of switching strategies, we can restrict attention
to potential deviations within that class. If there is no proﬁtable deviation to a switching strategy, there will not
be a proﬁtable deviation to a non-switching strategy.
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suﬃcient conditions for double symmetric switching strategies to be equilibria. In a second step
it is shown that, provided that the information gathered carries some noise, a unique equilibrium
exists for each combination of the exogenous parameters.19 In a last step, we ﬁnd the unique
equilibrium in function of these parameters.
Lemma 2 : characterization of the equilibrium.
A pair of cutoﬀs (e ee) is an equilibrium in symmetric switching strategies iﬀ
(a) (ee e ee) = 0 (e e ee) = 0 and e ≥ ee or
(b) (ee e ee) = 0(e e ee) = 0 and e ≤ ee
An equilibrium is found by the intersection of the post-merger eﬀort decision function, im-
plicitly deﬁned by (·) = 0, and either the “I-will-later-exert-eﬀfort” merger decision function
((·) = 0) or the “I-will-later-not-exert-eﬀort” merger decision function ((·) = 0). The ﬁrst
intersection is an equilibrium if and only if, in this intersection, ﬁrms exert eﬀort for a larger
range of private signals than they merge (e ≥ ee). Indeed, in such intersections, if the private
signal is higher than the eﬀort cutoﬀ ( ≥ ee), a ﬁrm merges when the private signal is higher
than the merger cutoﬀ deﬁned by the “I-will-later-exert-eﬀort” function ( ≥ e). If the private
signal is lower than the eﬀort cutoﬀ (  ee), the ﬁrm would never merge. On the other hand,
an intersection of (·) and (·) where e  ee is not an equilibrium. When the private signal is
below the eﬀort cutoﬀ (  ee), the “I-will-later-exert-eﬀort” merger function does not apply.
The same reasoning holds for the other intersection.
The next step is to show that when the private signal has enough noise there is a unique
pair that satisﬁes (a) or (b) of the previous lemma, and therefore a unique equilibrium exists.
Proposition 1 : Existence and Uniqueness of the equilibrium.
If  ≥ ∗ ≡ 6(−2)(3−4)(−1) there is a unique equilibrium in symmetric switching strategies
The merger decision of each ﬁrm transforms part of its private information into public. This
public information has a “multiplier eﬀect” on all actions, because both ﬁrms know that the
19Uniqueness of equilibrium is not straightforward in our game. Although eﬀort decisions are strategic com-
plements with respect to each other, merger and eﬀort decisions are not. For a comprehensive analysis of games
with strategic complementarities, see Vives [66].
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partner has received this information. Public information, therefore, exceeds its pure informa-
tional content and the problem of self-fulﬁlling beliefs arises again. This is a feature that keeps
on returning in the global games literature: one needs the public signal to be noisy enough to
reach a unique equilibrium (Morris and Shin [40]). The particular feature in our model, however,
is that the private signal becomes partly public through the merger decision. Thus, in order to
have uniqueness, we need the private signal to be noisy enough. Angeletos et al. [4] obtain a
result in the same spirit as ours in a dynamic version of the game of Morris and Shin [40].
Assuming that this condition is satisﬁed, we are able to characterize the unique equilibrium
in function of the parameters of our model.
Proposition 2 : Equilibrium.
Deﬁning ∗ ≡ 2−1 − 3 , the symmetric switching equilibrium (e ee) satisﬁes:
(a) If  = −1 then e = ∗ = ee
(b) If   −1 then e  ∗  ee
(c) If   −1 then e  ∗  ee.
First, in (a) above, a special case of the exogenous parameters, merger and eﬀort decisions are
the same. Firms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to merge in the same cases where they optimally exert eﬀort.
Second, if the costs of merging are higher, then merging becomes more expensive. As a direct
consequence, ﬁrms merge less and the cutoﬀ from merging is higher than before. Indirectly,
since the acceptance of merging transmits a more positive signal, ﬁrms exert eﬀort more easily
than before and the cutoﬀ from making an eﬀort is lower (part b). Finally, following the same
reasoning, if the opportunity costs of merging are lower ﬁrms merge more and exert eﬀort less
often (part c).
3.3 Extension
We now brieﬂy consider the case in which ﬁrms receive a private and a public signal before
merging. The introduction of a public signal  along with the private signals  and  does
not signiﬁcantly alter the results. The proposition can be restated in terms of the two types of
information, as shown in the following proposition. In particular, noisy enough signals are again
suﬃcient to ensure uniqueness.
Proposition 3 : Extension to private and public information.
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There exists a unique ∗∗ such that if  ≥ ∗∗ then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium






−1 −  − 2 if  ≤ 2−1 − 3
 + 2 +  −
p
2 + 2(2)2 if   2−1 − 3
the equilibrium is such that
(a) If  = −1 then e = ∗∗ = ee
(b) If   −1 then e  ∗∗  ee
(c) If   −1 then e  ∗∗  ee
4 Post-Merger Failures
We now give a formal deﬁnition of failure. Mergers are evaluated at the end of the post-merger
process, once partners observe the equilibrium eﬀorts, ∗1 and ∗2.20
Deﬁnition 3 A post-merger failure occurs when both ﬁrms agree to merge but, at the end of the
post-merger process, the gains expected by each merging partner are lower than the stand-alone





( |   ∗  ∗ )2−   
We deﬁne failure gross of the cost of eﬀort. Indeed, to evaluate whether a merger is a
failure in terms of proﬁts (and share prices), the cost of eﬀort of the management should not be
included. Second, we deﬁne failure in expected terms. Failure can of course always occur when
the realization of the uncertain gains  is lower than expected, independent of the level of eﬀort
exerted by the partners. Third, we consider the merger a failure when it is considered a failure by
each individual partner. This is done for notational ease, but our deﬁnition would be equivalent
to each partner evaluating the sum of proﬁts, given its information. Finally, each individual
partner considers whether the merger is a failure using the information it has available. This
is the strongest possible deﬁnition of failure. As we show in the following lemma, post-merger
failures can then only occur when none of the partners exerts eﬀort. As such, we establish a
lower bound of the failure rates in function of our parameters.
20Even though partners can observe the post-merger eﬀort level chosen by the other at the end of the process,
these eﬀorts are, as mentioned above, asssumed to be non-veriﬁable and therefore non-contractible.
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Lemma 3 A post-merger failure occurs if and only if both partners merge and exert no eﬀort.
The proof of this result is straightforward. First, if none of the partners makes any eﬀort,
this is a post-merger failure by deﬁnition. Second, if they merge and only one makes an eﬀort,
this is not a failure. The partner that made no eﬀort merged because this was a proﬁtable
decision, even before knowing with certainty the eﬀort choice of its partner. After observing
that the partner has exerted eﬀort, it should expect even higher proﬁts. Third, if both exert
eﬀort, the same reasoning holds. Both entered the merger without knowing the action of the
partner in the post-merger stage and should expect higher proﬁts after observing it.
We are now ready to formally state our explanation of merger failures. In the next corollary,
that follows directly from Proposition 2 and Lemma 3, we describe in which situations post-
merger failures occur.
Corollary 1 : post-merger failures.
When all information about uncertain merger gains is private, post-merger failures occur
when   −1 and e ≤   ee for  = 1 2
As shown in Lemma 3, a post-merger failure can only occur if both ﬁrms choose to merge
but not to exert post-merger eﬀort. For this to happen, it is necessary that the merger decision
is taken more easily than the eﬀort decision, i.e. in equilibrium one must have that e  ee. By
Proposition 2, this occurs when the costs of merging () are low, the degree of complementarity
of eﬀorts () is low and the costs of eﬀort () are high enough such that   −1 . In order
for a failure to de facto occur, it must be that the private signals received by both partners
are intermediate, e ≤   ee for  = 1 2. Both partners have gathered information about the
merger gains, which are good enough to merge (merging costs are low) but not so good so as
to exert eﬀort (cost of eﬀort is high). Indeed, each gives a reasonable probability that the other
will exert eﬀort and prefers to free-ride on it (the degree of complementarity is low). The merger
then goes ahead but fails because both choose not to exert eﬀort.
We have assumed that private signals remain private throughout. But failure could not be
avoided even if communication was possible. As argued in the introduction, a potential partner
does not want, or is not allowed, to give out all its information before merging. Failure could
not be avoided by post-merger communication either. Each partner has incentives to overstate
its private signal independently of its eﬀort decisions. Indeed, one partner always prefers the
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other to exert eﬀort. Under these conditions, credible communication cannot be supported in
equilibrium, as shown by Baliga and Morris [6].
From Lemma 3 it is clear that if post-merger eﬀorts were guaranteed, a post-merger failure
would never occur. Notice that in that case, merging partner  would choose to merge whenever
( |   ≥ ˆ) − 2( + ) ≥ 0 and the symmetric equilibrium in switching strategies would
be ˆ = 2( + ) − 3  Then, in our model, when  for  = 1 2 is such that e    ee and
 ≥ ˆ a post-merger failure would have been avoided if both partners had merged and had
exerted eﬀort. On the other hand, if   ˆ or   ˆ and e    ee for  = 1 2 then the
post-merger failure would not have occurred if the post-merger eﬀorts were guaranteed since the
merger would not have gone through.
5 Comparative statics
In Section 3, we showed that our game has a unique equilibrium in the class of symmetric
switching strategies if the private signal is not very precise. Here, we exploit this property
to analyze which situations should lead to more merger failures as deﬁned in Section 4. We
analyze how the probability of failure, given  varies with the exogenous parameters of the
model. To avoid uninteresting situations, we analyze the cases where it is possible that ﬁrms
merge (e ≤ + ) and where it is possible that they do not exert eﬀort (ee  − ). Further, we
concentrate on the most natural case in which more post-merger eﬀort leads to more incentives
to merge, which corresponds to the case in which the sum of the thresholds is positive, e+ee  0
(see the proof of Proposition 1). For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the case with private
information only.
The probability of failure is deﬁned as the probability that the merger fails, given that both
ﬁrms decided to merge. As shown in Lemma 3, failure is directly related to the probability that
a ﬁrm  does not exert a post-merger eﬀort when it has decided to merge.
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Deﬁnition 4 The “probability of failure” is the probability that the merger fails given that both
ﬁrms have decided to merge, that is, Prob(1  ee | 1  e )∗Prob(2  ee | 2  e ) where





+−max{−} if e ≤ ee
0 if e  ee
Costs of merging
Let us ﬁrst consider comparative statics with respect to ﬁxed costs of merging . Similar to the
intuition provided for Proposition 2, higher costs of merging lead ﬁrms to merge less easily. The
acceptance of the merger by the other partner thus yields more positive information. Therefore,
expected merger gains and the likelihood of the partner exerting post-merger eﬀort become
higher. Hence, the ﬁrm is more prone to exert eﬀort. Thus, the distance between ee and e
becomes smaller and that of between  +  and e larger. Therefore, the probability of failure is
lower.
Corollary 2 : Costs of merging.
Higher costs of merging ( greater) lead to less mergers (e greater) and more post-merger
eﬀort (ee lower) and therefore to a lower probability of failure.
The following ﬁgure shows as an example both cutoﬀs for the case in which  = 3,  = 2 and
 = 05, with  varying from 0 to 05 For  going from 0 to 025 e  ee and the possibility of
failure exists. And, the lower  is, the bigger the range where failure might occur. The ﬁgure
also depicts the merging cutoﬀ if post-merger eﬀorts were guaranteed. As argued in the previous
section, this cutoﬀ shows that the post-merger failure could have been avoided either by exerting
eﬀort (in the region above) or by not merging (in the region below).
Insert Figure 2 about here
Costs of post-merger eﬀort
We now turn to the cost  of exerting post-merger eﬀort. First, higher costs  lead partners to
exert less eﬀort. As a result, ﬁrms merge less since they also expect their partners to exert less
eﬀort. However, while the cost of eﬀort  has a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s eﬀort decisions, on
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the merger decision it has only a second-order eﬀect. Cutoﬀ ee rises therefore faster than cutoﬀ
e and the possibility of failure becomes higher.
Corollary 3 : Costs of post-merger efforts.
Higher costs of post-merger eﬀort ( greater) lead to less mergers (e greater) and less eﬀort
(ee greater) and therefore to a higher probability of failure.
The following ﬁgure shows as an example both cutoﬀs for the case in which  = 3,  = 2 and
 = 025, with  varying from 025 to 075 For  greater than 05 e  ee and the possibility of
failure exists. And, the greater  is the bigger the range where failure might occur.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Complementarity of post-merger eﬀorts
We now turn to the measure  of degree of complementarity of post-merger actions. The higher
 is, the more complementary post-merger eﬀorts are. More complementarity punishes “one-
sided” eﬀort more heavily as it discounts even more the non-synergistic merger gains in the case
where only one partner exerts eﬀort. Thus, if a ﬁrm accepts the merger, it will more easily exert
post-merger eﬀorts. Therefore, at the merger stage, each ﬁrm gives a higher probability that
its partner will make an eﬀort. This eﬀect should induce ﬁrms to merge more often. There is,
however, a second and opposite eﬀect at the merger stage. Although one-sided eﬀort occurs less
often, the losses when this happens are larger for a higher complementarity. As a consequence,
ﬁrms might merge less. In what follows, we show that this second eﬀect is stronger and ﬁrms
consequently merge less for a higher complementarity. Given that they also exert eﬀort more
often, the probability of failure therefore becomes smaller.
Unfortunately, because of the two opposite eﬀects on merging explained above, it is not
possible to derive the result analytically. As shown in Lemma 2, the merger and the post-
merger eﬀort equilibrium strategies are the unique solution of a complex non-linear system of
equations: the intersection of an increasing function (ee(e), determined by ()), and a decreasing
function (e(ee), determined by either () or (), depending on the parameter region). Given
that the costs of merging and the costs of eﬀort shift only one of these curves, we have been
able to derive implicit comparative statics results analytically. Unfortunately, in the case of the
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complementarity of the eﬀorts, , a change in the exogenous variable shifts both curves. On the
one hand, a higher  shifts the curve e(ee) outwards. On the other hand, it shifts the curve ee(e)
inwards. Although this unambiguously leads to more eﬀort as ee decreases, showing wether this
leads to more or less merers is not straightforward, as the net eﬀect on e is not clear.
By making use of simulation techniques, however, we are able to show that a higher 
indeed leads to a higher e. In a spreadsheet available from the authors’ webpages, it is possible
to select an exogenous range for , ,  and , and the number of discrete points to analyze.
The programme then shows the minimum of e() − e( − 1) for all  and the maximum of
ee() − ee( − 1) for all . For every combination of ,  and , the minimum is positive and
therefore e()− e(− 1) is positive for any  and e(·) is always increasing and mergers are thus
less frequent. Similarly, given that the maximum is negative, ee()− ee(− 1) is negative for any
 and therefore ee(·) is decreasing. We state these ﬁndings in the following result.
Result 5 : Complementarity of post-merger efforts.
A higher complementarity of eﬀorts ( greater) leads to less mergers (e greater) and more
post-merger eﬀort (ee lower) and therefore to a lower probability of failure.
As an example, the next ﬁgure shows the cutoﬀs for the case {  } = {015 2 05}
Insert Figure 4 about here
6 Empirical predictions
In this section we propose empirical operalizations of our comparative statics and indicate
whether existing empirical evidence can be matched to our predictions.
Costs of merging
Prediction 1 Higher costs of merging lead to less mergers and less failures.
We propose three measures of costs of merging that have been used in the literature: (i) the
ﬁrms’ degree of cash-richness, (ii) the economy-wide capital liquidity, and (iii) for large ﬁrms,
the strictness of merger policy in a jurisdiction.
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(i) A ﬁrst measure of the costs of merging can be the ﬁrms’ degree of cash-richness. Harford [27]
argues that the transaction costs of merging can be lowered by holding cash reserves. A ﬁrm
can avoid the costs associated with external ﬁnancing if it maintains suﬃcient internal ﬁnancial
ﬂexibility. He shows indeed that ﬁrms that have built up large cash reserves are more active
in the merger market, even when controlling for stock price performance and sales growth. A
higher cash reserve can thus be linked to lower costs of merging.
Our prediction is in line with Harford’s [27] results on merger performance. He ﬁnds that both
operating performance and abnormal stock price reactions to acquisition bid announcements by
cash-rich bidders are negative and decreasing in the amount of excess cash held by the bidder.
He attributes these results to “agency-theories”, where a cash stockpile insulates managers from
monitoring by external markets. Our model shows that it might also be that higher cash piles
-and therefore lower transaction costs- induce less eﬀort and hence increase merger failure.
(ii) Costs of merging can be measured by the aggregate level of capital liquidity. Harford [29]
shows that high aggregate capital liquidity, which reduces the costs of merging, is a necessary
condition for mergers to occur in waves. Although economic, regulatory and technological
shocks drive merger beneﬁts, whether these shocks lead to a merger ‘wave’, he argues, depends
on whether there is suﬃcient overall capital liquidity.21
Although there is no direct evidence linking aggregate cost of capital and merger performance,
one can make indirect inferences. Since high capital liquidity is linked with the occurrence of
merger waves, one can use the existing empirical evidence on the performance of wave-mergers
as opposed to non-wave mergers. Consistent with our prediction, Gugler et al. [24] shows
that wave-mergers perform signiﬁcantly worse than non-wave mergers in the long term. The
median abnormal return after three years is more than 11% lower for wave-mergers. Further,
Harford’s [28] wave-dummy is signiﬁcantly negative for diﬀerent regressions of long-run merger
performance. Also Rosen [52] ﬁnds that long-run returns are signiﬁcantly lower for mergers an-
nounced in periods when the merger market is booming. These papers explain this observation
due to merger waves coinciding not only with high cash liquidity, but also overvalued stockmar-
kets. The reason oﬀered by these so-called “misvaluation” theories goes as follows: during times
21This reasoning is remiscent to Shleifer and Vishny [54] who hypothesize that part of the reason why merger
waves always occur in booms is because booms typically coincide with increases in cash ﬂows and thus less ﬁnancial
constraints.
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of high valuations over-valued acquirers prefer to ﬁnance deals with stocks, and targets accept
these oﬀers. Our model, thus, oﬀers an alternative logic for these observations.
(iii) One could ﬁnally argue that the costs of merging are higher in regimes with stricter merger
policies. Strictness of a merger policy in a given year can be deﬁned as the number of merger
prohibitions or the total number of merger policy actions (prohibitions and merger remedies).
Seldeslachts et al. [57] conﬁrm that a stricter merger policy is perceived by (large) ﬁrms as
leading to a higher cost of merging. A test could be derived to assess not only the incentives to
merge, but also a merger’s subsequent performance.
In sum, we propose three measures that can be related to the cost of merging, which make them
thus potentially useful measures to test our ﬁrst prediction. While the ﬁrst two measures -an
individual ﬁrm’s degree of cash-richness and the economy-wide capital liquidity- are related and
empirical evidence on these is consistent with our model’s predictions, the third measure -the
strictness of merger policy- has so far not been connected to merger performance.
Costs of post-merger eﬀort
Prediction 2 Higher costs of post-merger eﬀort lead to less mergers and more failures.
To obtain a direct measure for cost of eﬀort is hard.22 One can, however, make a link between
ability and cost of eﬀort, where for more able agents it is less costly to exert eﬀort.23 Then,
in the context of mergers, the ability of (managers in) ﬁrms during the post-merger stage has
been linked to (i) the knowledge base of merging ﬁrms and (ii) the experience built in previous
mergers. We explain each factor in turn and relate existing empirical evidence to our prediction.
(i) Ahuja and Katila [3] and Cloodt et al. [14] argue that a greater pre-merger knowledge base
has a positive impact on the post-merger (innovation) performance. The underlying reasoning
22There are few papers that have tried to empirically measure cost of eﬀort. Foster and Rosenzweig [22] provide
a direct test for eﬀort and cost of eﬀort, using information on worker’s health, consumption and work time.
Delfgauw and Dur [16] test whether people diﬀer in their disutility from work eﬀort because they face diﬀerent
external constraints (e.g. the care for children). See Prendergast [45] for an overview of empirical tests of agency
models in ﬁrms.
23 In Spence’s [62] signaling model, for example, clever people can signal their ability through education, given
that their cost of studying is lower.
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is that (innovation) outputs are often the result of recombining existing elements of knowledge
into new syntheses (Kogut and Zander [34], Teece et al. [61]). Then, the number of post-merger
direct combinations of existing elements increases exponentially with the size of its knowledge
base.24 Thus, one can argue that ability is higher -and costs of post-merger eﬀort to realize
synergies lower- for ﬁrms with larger pre-merger knowledge bases.
Given this operalization of post-merger costs of eﬀort, our prediction is in line with empirical
results. Both Ahuja and Katila [3] and Cloodt et al. [14] codify the size of the knowledge base by
the pre-merger stock of patents. Ahuja and Katila [3] ﬁnd that the pre-merger stock of patents
has a positive impact on the post-merger innovation performance, measured as the number of
successful patent applications 1-4 years after the merger. Cloodt et al. [14], using the same
methodology, conﬁrm this ﬁnding, although the positive eﬀect disappears after two years in
some industries.
(ii) One can relate the cost of post-merger eﬀort to the merging experience of ﬁrms. Singh and
Zollo [60] and Vermeulen and Barkema [64], for example, argue that knowledge accumulation
through past mergers might have a positive impact on the performance of subsequent mergers.
Thus, a more merger-experienced ﬁrm should have learnt from past mergers and should therefore
have a lower cost in exerting post-merger eﬀort.25
Given this operalization of post-merger costs of eﬀort, our prediction is in line with empirical
results. A measure of merger experience can be obtained by simply counting the number of
previous mergers, which is one of the measures used by Singh and Zollo [60] and Vermeulen
and Barkema [64]. Singh and Zollo [60] ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of past within-industry merger
experience on post-merger return on assets. Vermeulen and Barkema [64] ﬁnd an additional
merger increases the probability that subsequent mergers will survive by 3.4 percent.
In sum, given that the cost of post-merger eﬀort is diﬃcult to observe directly, we propose using
as proxies the knowledge base of merging ﬁrms -measurable through the pre-merger stock of
24For example, while a ﬁrm with ﬁve units of knowledge can generate ten combinations using two elements at
a time, acquiring another ﬁrm with three units of knowledge increases the number of combinations that become
available to twenty eight.
25To be more precise, the literature on how merger experience translates into learning may also be dependent on
how well ﬁrms codify this knowledge, in which type of mergers ﬁrms were previously involved and whether these
mergers were successes or failures. See e.g. Hayward [31] for a detailed investigation on how merger experience
translates into learning and thus lower costs of post-merger eﬀort in subsequent mergers.
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patents- and the accumulated merger experience of merging partners -measurable through a
count of previous merger participations. Existing evidence on the impact on post-merger R&D
output or return on assets is consistent with our second prediction.
Complementarity of post-merger eﬀorts
Prediction 3 Higher complementarity of post-merger eﬀorts leads to less mergers and less fail-
ures.
There are several empirical papers that try to capture the degree of complementarities between
merging ﬁrms, mostly in the context of technology and innovation. We shortly explain these
papers, classiﬁed per methodology, and indicate again where and how one could relate their
results to the predictions of our model.
(i) Cassiman et al. [12] look at mergers that diﬀer in their degree of technological comple-
mentarities. Merging ﬁrms are classiﬁed as having more complementarities if they had R&D
projects in diﬀerent technological ﬁelds and/or had developed capabilities in the diﬀerent stages
of the R&D process (e.g. basic research from one side and development from the other). They
ﬁnd that mergers between partners coming from technologically more complementary ﬁelds lead
to higher post-merger R&D eﬀort, less organizational problems and more R&D output. These
ﬁndings are consistent with our third prediction if one relates merger failure (or success) to R&D
output.
(ii) Ahuja and Katila [3] and Ornaghi [41],[42] connect the degree of relatedness of the knowledge
bases of the merging ﬁrms to their (innovative) performances, where relatedness is measured
through the number of common patents and patent citations. Since each patent number uniquely
identiﬁes a distinct component of knowledge, they argue, the lower the number of patents that are
common across two knowledge bases, the lower the relatedness between those knowledge bases.
Therefore, the lower the number of common patents, the higher the degree of complementarity.
Ornaghi [41] ﬁnds that a higher level of pre-merger technological relatedness between merged
parties -and hence lower complementarities- is associated with both a lower post-merger R&D
input and output, thus leading to poorer post-merger innovation performances. Furthermore,
Ornaghi [42] ﬁnds a merger’s stock value to be higher in subsequent years for a lower level of
pre-merger technological relatedness.
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(iii) Puranam et al. [46] argue that mergers might involve “component technologies”, used as
components of larger product systems, or “standalone technologies”, used for creating stand-
alone products. They claim that component technologies exhibit greater complementarities than
standalone products. Indeed, the extent of eﬀort interdependence is higher because component
technologies cannot be used without signiﬁcant adjustments to both components. They do not
provide an empirical test of which type of merger is more successful.
In sum, there are various ways how one can capture the degree of complementarities between
merging ﬁrms. Complementarities can be measured through the degree of relatedness in projects
and processes (Cassiman et al. [12]), ﬁnal products (Puranam et al. [46], Cassiman et al. [12])
or pre-merger knowledge bases (Ahuja and Katila [3], Ornaghi, [41],[42]). Some of the existing
evidence (Cassiman et al. [12], and Ornaghi [41],[42]) can be related to our model and it is
consistent with our third prediction.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposed a novel explanation as to why some mergers fail while others succeed based
on pre-merger informational asymmetries, and problems of cooperation and coordination in the
post-merger stage. We showed that each ﬁrm’s management may optimally agree to merge and
abstain from exerting post-merger eﬀorts, expecting the merger partner to make the necessary
eﬀorts. We argued that, provided that they have the same information as their management,
shareholders of each ﬁrm accept the merger agreement. The merger then goes ahead and fails.
Accordingly, these mergers are unproﬁtable. Share prices, on the other hand, can rise at
the merger’s announcement. Indeed, if the market has no more information than the ﬁrm, it
should bid up the ﬁrm’s price because the ﬁrm will take the appropriate merger decision in
expected terms. Therefore, our setup may serve as an alternative to Fridolfsson and Stennek’s
[21] explanation for the empirical merger puzzle that unproﬁtable mergers often coincide with
initially increasing share prices.
We identiﬁed under which conditions mergers are more likely to fail and explained how one
can empirically test our predictions. First, lower merging costs, induced by, for example, a
higher level of capital liquidity, induce ﬁrms not only to merge more but also to less often exert
eﬀort. As a result, failures occur with a higher probability. Second, higher costs of eﬀort, which
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can for instance be related to ﬁrms having built less experience in previous mergers, lead to less
mergers but still relatively more failures. Finally, higher complementarities between merging
ﬁrms -in R&D for example- lead to less mergers but at the same time less failures. We further
argued that the existing empirical evidence is consistent with these predictions.
Given the likelihood of failure, it is not surprising that ﬁrms go through great lengths in
signaling to their prospective partners their commitment to the merger. Indeed, management’s
commitment has shown to be crucial in achieving merger success. Weber [67], for example, ﬁnds
evidence for top managers’ commitment -where commitment is deﬁned as “[...] a willingness to
exert considerable eﬀort on behalf of the organization”- to have a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on
mergers’ ﬁnancial performance in subsequent years.
Our framework focussed on a merger for synergies, where partners are kept as separately
fully functioning. A simpliﬁed version of our framework could be extended by letting ﬁrms
decide, as a function of the importance of synergy gains, between a merger of equals and a
takeover. In a takeover, one ﬁrm buys out the other and gets rid of the strategic uncertainty in
the post-merger stage. This forecloses the possibility of failure, but comes at the expense of the
possibility of achieving synergy gains. In some cases, if the potential synergy gains are low, this
might be optimal. More generally, one could allow for a sharing agreement which speciﬁes the
allocation of cash payments and shares of the proﬁts of the new entity (as in Banal-Estañol and
Ottaviani [8]). A particular case is where the merging ﬁrms split evenly the shares of the new
company, i.e. a merger of equals. The other extreme is where ﬁrms opt for a pure takeover by
assigning all the shares to one ﬁrm and transferring cash from this ﬁrm to the other.26 A full
investigation of this question is a challenging task for future research.
Finally, our insights may be suited for setups that go beyond mergers. In particular, co-
authors writing a paper, businessmen setting up a new enterprise or ﬁrms entering an alliance
may fail for the same reason. Failure may occur due to a lack of eﬀort of the partners, despite
both having voluntary entered the agreement. Consider for example the case of two co-authors
undertaking a project. The paper will only have a chance of success if at least one author is
suﬃciently optimistic about the prospects of the undertaking, but each of them may enter the
26More generally, one could allow for a sharing agreement which speciﬁes the allocation of cash payments and
shares of the proﬁts of the new entity (as in Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani [8]). Among possible agreements, the
merging ﬁrms may evenly split the shares of the new company, i.e. a merger of equals. Alternatively, they may
opt for a pure takeover by assigning all the shares to one ﬁrm and transferring cash from this ﬁrm to the other.
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project if they believe that their co-author is more enthusiastic than they are.
Appendix A: Beliefs
If  is a random variable with an improper distribution and ﬁrm  receives a private signal
 = + where  ∼ (− ) with  and  independent, we have that  |  ∼ (−  + ).
Firm  does not observe ﬁrm ’s private signal,  , but knows that  =  +  where
 ∼ (− ) and  and ,  and  are independent. Since  |  and  are uniforms, we know
that  |  is a sum of uniforms, which results in a distribution function with density function,





(2)2 if  ∈ [ − 2 ]
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if e ≤ ee ≤ 
1 if e  ee 
We can ﬁnd  |   ∼ ( | ) | ( | ) which is a uniform again, because  | 
is a sum of two uniform distributions and ( | ) is a uniform. We have then  |   ∼
 [min{ }+ max{ }− }] Given that
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 if   ee and ee  e
and for e ≤ ee we have that




 ( |  )]( | )
Pr (e ≤  ≤ ee | )
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and analogous expressions can be obtained.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Firm 1’ payoﬀ from proposing the merger depends on the probability that Firm 2 agrees to
merge. From the Law of Total Expectations, we can write Firm 1’s payoﬀ by proposing the
merger as [ +( | 1  2 ≥ e2)− 2 − 21] Pr (2 ≥ e2 | 1 ) +  Pr (2  e2 | 1 ).
Firm 1 agrees to propose as long as this expression is greater than  which, simplifying, amounts
to the condition ( | 1  2 ≥ e2)− 2 − 21 ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
First take a pair (e ee) that satisﬁes part (a). Suppose that ﬁrm  is using this switching strategy
with cutoﬀs (e ee). As argued in footnote 23, we only need to consider deviations within the
class of switching strategies. By deﬁnition of (e ee), Firm’s  best response is to use, in the
post-merger stage, a switching strategy with cutoﬀ ee. Now consider two cases. Suppose ﬁrst
that Firm  receives a private signal  below ee. Knowing that it is not going to integrate,
we can show that it is not going to merge, that is ( e ee)  0. Since () is an increasing
function of  we have that ( e ee)  (ee e ee). By deﬁnition of   and , we have
that (·) = (·) − (·) and also (ee e ee) = 0. Since (·) is an increasing function in  and
(e e ee) = 0 and e ≥ ee then (ee e ee)  0 Hence, ( e ee)  0 and Firm  does not want
to merge. Suppose secondly that Firm  receives a private signal  above ee. Then it is going to
merge, knowing that it is going to exert eﬀort, whenever  ≥ e by deﬁnition of (·) We have
shown that Firm  will merge whenever its private signal is above e.
We now show that a pair (e0 ee0) that satisﬁes (ee0 e0 ee0) = 0 and (e0 e0 ee0) = 0 but ee0  e0
is not an equilibrium. Suppose that Firm  uses a switching strategy with cutoﬀs (e0 ee0). Firm’s
 best response is to use a switching strategy with cutoﬀ ee0 in the post-merger stage. Suppose
that Firm  receives a private signal  = e0 − . Knowing that it does not exert eﬀort, it
will merge whenever ( e0 ee0) ≥ 0 But since ( e0 ee0) = ( e0 ee0) − ( e0 ee0) and
( e0 ee0)  0 and ( e0 ee0) is arbitrarily close to 0 when  tends to 0, ( e0 ee0)  0 and
it will merge. Then e0 cannot be a cutoﬀ point.
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The same arguments apply for (b).
Proof of Proposition 1
From the deﬁnition of (), we have that
(ee e ee) ≡ (− 1)( |  ) Pr ( ≥ ee | ) +( |  ) Pr ( ≤ ee | )− 2 ≥ 0
where abusing of the notation  = {  ≥ ee},  = {   ee} and  ≡ {ee  ≥ e}.
This expression is increasing in e. As shown in Appendix A, we can obtain for the uniform
distribution that if ee ≥ e
(ee e ee) = (− 1)(3
ee+ )(2)2 + (ee− e) hee(6 − e− 3ee) + (ee+ e)(3 + e+ ee)i
6(2)2 − 3(e− ee+ 2)2 − 2
whereas if ee  e,
(ee e ee) = (− 1)(2ee+  + e)
3
− 2
We can show that when  ≥ 6(−2)(3−4)(−1) , then (ee e ee) is also increasing in ee Then, by the
implicit function theorem, we get that ee, such that (ee e ee) = 0 is a decreasing function of e
Using the implicit function theorem again we can show that e00 such that(e00 e00 ee00) = 0 is
an increasing function of ee00 except when e00−ee00  0 and e00+ee00  0. Outside this region more
eﬀort implies more incentives to merge. Therefore, if e00 such that (e00 e00 ee00) = 0 is never in
this region, there is a unique pair (b0 bb0) such that (bb0 b0 bb0) = 0 and (b0 b0 bb0) = 0. In the
case in which it is (and more eﬀort implies less incentives to merge), we can also show that there
is a unique pair (b0 bb0) because the two curves could never cross twice. This can never happen
because the derivative of e00(ee00) is increasing and that of ee(e) is decreasing and the derivative
of the ﬁrst function at e0 is larger than the derivative of the second at ee. Similarly, we can show
that there is a unique pair (b bb) such that (bb b bb) = 0 and (b b bb) = 0.
Suppose ﬁrst that b ≤ bb. This is, by the previous lemma, an equilibrium. Now we need to
show that (b0 bb0) such that (bb0 b0 bb0) = 0 and (b0 b0 bb0) = 0 is not, i.e. that b0 ≤ bb0. Since
(bb b bb) = 0 and (bb b bb) ≥ (b b bb) = 0, we have that(bb b bb) = (bb b bb)−(bb b bb) ≥ 0.
Since bb(b) such that (bb b bb) = 0 is a decreasing function, the combination (b0 bb0) such that
(bb0 b0 bb0) = 0 and (b0 b0 bb0) = 0 should satisfy b0 ≤ b and bb0 ≥ bb. But then, since b ≤ bb
then b0 ≤ bb0 and therefore, from the previous lemma (b0 bb0) cannot be an equilibrium. If,
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secondly, b  bb then (b bb) is not an equilibrium by the previous lemma. However, following a
similar reasoning as above we can show that b0  bb0 and therefore (b0 bb0) is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
(a) Suppose ﬁrst that  = −1 . If e = ee = 2−1− 3 ≡ ∗ then ( | e  ≥ e  ≥ ee) = 2−1 and
Pr ( ≥ ee | e  ≥ e) = 1 and (ee e ee) = (e e ee) = (e e ee) = 0 This is an equilibrium
because parts (a) and (b) of Lemma 2 are satisﬁed. Moreover this equilibrium is unique by
Proposition 1.
(b) Second, it   −1 then (∗ ∗ ∗) = (∗ ∗ ∗)  0 and following an argument
similar to the one presented in the proof of the previous proposition, the equilibrium satisﬁes
part (a) in Lemma 2.
(c) When   −1 then (∗ ∗ ∗) = (∗ ∗ ∗)  0 and then the equilibrium satisﬁes
part (b) in Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
Following the same procedure as in Section 3, we are going to obtain ( e  ee  ), ( e  ee  )
and ( e  ee  ). The same arguments of the proof of Lemma 2 apply here and we need
again to look for intersections of (ee e ee ) and (e e ee ) when ee ≤ e and of (ee e ee )
and (e e ee ) when ee ≥ e. As in Proposition 1, there exists ∗∗ such that (ee e ee ) is an
increasing function of ee and therefore the equilibrium is unique. Similar to Proposition 2, we
have that when  = −1 , an equal cutoﬀ for the merging and eﬀort decisions, ∗∗ = e = ee satis-
ﬁes (∗ ∗ ∗ ) = (∗ ∗ ∗ ) = (∗ ∗ ∗ ) = 0 and is therefore an equilibrium. The
expression, in function of  and the exogenous variables, is stated in the text. And, similarly, if
  −1 or   −1 we have the orderings in (b) and (c), respectively.
Proof of Corollary 2
Given that (·) is decreasing in  and increasing in e e(ee ) such that (ee e ee ) = 0 is
increasing in  On the other hand, (·) is an independent function of . Given that ee(e) such
that (ee e ee) = 0 is a decreasing function of e, we have that if (e ee) satisfy (ee e ee) = 0
and (ee e ee ) = 0 and (e0 ee0) satisfy (ee0 e0 ee0) = 0 and (ee0 e0 ee0 0) = 0 for 0   then
e  e0 and ee  ee0. The same arguments apply for the intersections of (·) and (·).
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Proof of Corollary 3
Given that (·) is decreasing in  and increasing in ee ee(e ) such that (e e ee ) = 0 is increasing
in  On the other hand, (·) is an independent function of . Hence, given that e(ee) such that
(ee e ee) = 0 is an increasing function of ee, we have that if (e ee) satisfy (ee e ee) = 0 and
(ee e ee ) = 0 and (e0 ee0) satisfy (ee0 e0 ee0) = 0 and (ee0 e0 ee0 0) = 0 for 0   then e  e0
and ee  ee0. Therefore, higher costs of integrating lead to less mergers and less integration.
In order to show that it also leads to lower probability of failure, we also need to show
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Figure 1: Timing of the Game.
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Figure 2: Merging cutoﬀ e (thick line), post-merger eﬀort cutoﬀ ee (dotted line) and merging
cutoﬀ when the post-merger eﬀorts are guaranteed b (thin line) as a function of the costs of
merging .
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Figure 3: Merging cutoﬀ e (thick line) and post-merger eﬀort cutoﬀ ee (dotted line) as a
function of the costs of eﬀort .
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Figure 4: Merging cutoﬀ e (thick line) and post-merger eﬀort cutoﬀ ee (dotted line) as a
function of the complementarity  of post-merger eﬀorts.
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